π° This is a Real News Article
This bulletin covers actual vulnerabilities disclosed on December 6, 2025 that are actively being exploited in the wild. The CVEs, threat actors, and technical details described are real and sourced from CISA, The Hacker News, security researchers, and vendor advisories. Take immediate action if affected.
React servers. AI coding assistants. CI/CD pipelines. Agentic browsers. Four critical disclosures in 48 hours have exposed the full modern dev stackβfrom your front-end frameworks to your build systems and cloud storage. If your teams ship code with React, rely on AI IDEs, or automate with GitHub Actions, this week changed your threat model.
This is not a drill. Multiple vendors, cloud providers, and government agencies are treating these issues as emergency-level incidents with accelerated patch deadlines and active threat hunting. Chinese APT groups were observed exploiting within hours of disclosure.
β οΈ ACTIVE THREAT SUMMARY
10.0
Max CVSS
30+
CVEs Total
48h
To Exploit
5+
APT Groups
π EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- 1.React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) β CVSS 10.0 unauthenticated RCE in React Server Components
- 2.IDEsaster β 30+ vulnerabilities in AI coding tools enabling data exfiltration and RCE
- 3.PromptPwnd β AI agents in CI/CD pipelines executing malicious commands via prompt injection
- 4.Comet Browser β Zero-click Google Drive wiper via agentic browsing behavior
Bottom line: Treat this as a coordinated campaign against your software supply chain. Patch React immediately. Lock down AI automation today.
β IF YOU ONLY DO 3 THINGS TODAY
- 1
Upgrade React Server Components to 19.0.1+ on all Internet-facing services
Owner: Platform/SRE β’ Packages: react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-parcel, react-server-dom-turbopack
- 2
Enable manual approval for ALL AI IDE file operations
Owner: Engineering β’ Disable auto-approve on settings.json writes in Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf
- 3
Audit CI/CD workflows using AI for PR review, triage, or automation
Owner: DevOps/Security β’ Strip GITHUB_TOKEN write access from AI agents
The Pattern: "Secure for AI"
Across all four disclosures, the pattern is the same: capabilities added for convenience are being repurposed as attack primitives. Security researcher Ari Marzouk calls this "Secure for AI"βtreating AI agent capabilities as part of the attack surface, not inherently safe add-ons.
1. Prompt Injection
Hidden instructions hijack AI intent
2. Auto-Approval Abuse
Legitimate features executed without review
3. Privilege Inheritance
AI operates with full user permissions
The four threats below are proof points of this pattern. Each exploits a different layer of the modern dev stack.

THREAT 01
React Server Components under attack
THREAT 01
React2Shell: The Perfect 10
π VULNERABILITY
React2Shell
CVE-2025-55182
CVSS
10.0
Send one HTTP request, own the server. No auth required.
Pre-authentication remote code execution in React's server communication protocol. Any internet-facing React Server Components deployment can become an entry point for full environment compromise.
π‘ WHY IT MATTERS FOR YOU
App Teams
Any React Server Components app can become an entry point for credential theft and lateral movement.
Platform/SRE
Cloud scans show hundreds of thousands of exposed servers. Mass exploitation is realistic.
Security Leaders
Maximum severity + trivial exploitation = "patch-or-be-breached" over the next few days.
Unauthenticated attackers can execute arbitrary code on any server running React Server Components. Chinese APT groups exploited this within hours. CISA deadline: December 26.
FIXED VERSIONS:
- β’ react-server-dom-webpack:
19.0.1,19.1.2,19.2.1 - β’ react-server-dom-parcel:
19.0.1,19.1.2,19.2.1 - β’ react-server-dom-turbopack:
19.0.1,19.1.2,19.2.1
π ARE YOU VULNERABLE?
- βgrep -r 'use server' in your codebase returns results
- βpackage.json includes react-server-dom-* < 19.0.1
- βRunning Next.js 14+ with app router and server actions
// ATTACK CHAIN
MITIGATIONS
THREAT 02
IDEsaster: Your IDE is a Browser Tab with RCE
π VULNERABILITY
IDEsaster
24 CVEs + more pending
CVSS
9.8
Clone a repo, lose your secrets. Your AI copilot is the attack vector.
30+ vulnerabilities in AI coding tools that chain prompt injection with auto-approved file operations to achieve data exfiltration and remote code execution on developer machines.
π‘ WHY IT MATTERS FOR YOU
Developers
Opening a "helpful" repo with AI turned on can silently turn your workstation into a data exfiltration node.
Security/Compliance
These tools touch source code, API keys, and internal systemsβcompromise impacts IP protection and regulatory exposure.
Engineering Leaders
Millions of developers use these tools. Default auto-approval behavior is now an attack surface.
AI assistants can be tricked via hidden instructions in repos to steal credentials, modify settings, or enable remote access. Every AI IDE is affected. Risk amplified by auto-approved operations.
π ARE YOU VULNERABLE?
- βUsing Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf, or any AI IDE with agent mode
- βAI auto-approves file writes to workspace
- βOpening untrusted repositories with AI features enabled
// ATTACK CHAIN
MITIGATIONS
THREAT 03
PromptPwnd: Your CI/CD is Attacker Infrastructure
π VULNERABILITY
PromptPwnd
Design Flaw Class (No single CVE)
CVSS
9.1
A malicious PR note can trick your AI bot into dumping secrets to an attacker's webhook.
This is a design flaw class, not a single bug. Any repository using AI for issue triage, PR labeling, code suggestions, or automated replies is at risk of prompt injection, command injection, secret exfiltration, and supply chain compromise.
π‘ WHY IT MATTERS FOR YOU
DevOps
Your build system can become a staging ground for attackers to harvest tokens, modify artifacts, or pivot into cloud environments.
Product Teams
Compromised pipelines can ship backdoored releases that impact every customer downstream.
Leadership
This is a supply chain problem, not just a code-scanning problem. It affects trust in your entire release process.
AI agents in CI/CD inherit pipeline permissions. Attackers embed prompts in PRs/issues that cause AI to exfiltrate secrets or modify code. Supply chain attack vector affecting downstream users.
AFFECTED PATTERNS:
- β’ AI PR review actions that read untrusted markdown and have GITHUB_TOKEN write access
- β’ Issue triage bots that can invoke tools or modify labels with elevated permissions
- β’ Automated code suggestion workflows that can write to protected branches
// ATTACK CHAIN
MITIGATIONS
THREAT 04
Comet: Passive Browsing β Active Destruction
π VULNERABILITY
Zero-Click Drive Wiper
Research Disclosure
CVSS
8.7
Visit a page, lose your Google Drive. No clicks required.
Any agentic browser that can click, type, and navigate on your behalf inherits this risk.The core issue: passive input (visiting a page) triggers active output (file deletion) under the user's authenticated session.
π‘ WHY IT MATTERS FOR YOU
Employees
Routine browsing while signed into corporate Google accounts can trigger large-scale data loss.
Security/IT
Traditional web security assumes passive rendering, not autonomous action driven by natural language prompts.
Leadership
Agentic tools that act on behalf of users must be governed like powerful automation, not just smarter browsers.
Agentic browsers inherit user sessions and permissions. Visiting a malicious page can trigger AI to navigate to Google Drive, email, or banking and take destructive actionsβzero clicks needed.
DEEP DIVE β The Agentic Trust Problem
Traditional browsers are passiveβthey render content. Agentic browsers actively interact on your behalf, inheriting your authenticated sessions. This creates a new primitive: passive input β active output.
Mitigation requires explicit user confirmation for destructive operationsβeven when the AI "thinks" that's what you wanted.
MITIGATIONS

RESPONSE
Time to act
What You Should Do Now
β NEXT 24 HOURS
- 1
Patch React Server Components
Owner: Platform/SRE β’ Upgrade to 19.0.1+ on all Internet-facing services. Treat as top-priority incident.
- 2
Lock down AI IDEs
Owner: Engineering β’ Turn on manual approval for file writes. Restrict AI agents to trusted internal repos.
- 3
Audit CI/CD AI integrations
Owner: DevOps/Security β’ Identify AI in reviews/triage/automation. Strip unnecessary permissions and secret access.
π THIS WEEK
- 4
Define AI security policies
Owner: Security/Leadership β’ Document what AI agents can read, write, and execute. Enforce via configuration and access controls.
- 5
Review external connectors and MCP servers
Owner: Security β’ Map data flows to/from AI tools. Treat connectors as untrusted until verified and monitored.
- 6
Train developers on AI threats
Owner: Engineering/Security β’ Make prompt injection, context poisoning, and auto-approval abuse part of standard DevSecOps training.
PRACTICE THESE ATTACKS
Work through targeted labs simulating both offensive and defensive sides:
